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LEGAL EFFECT OF PREINCORPORATION
SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENTS
IN CALIFORNIA
In California preincorporation subscription agreements usually
take the form of promises by subscribers or prospective shareholders
to purchase stock in a proposed corporation, or unissued shares in an
existing corporation.' While California statutes establish several min-
imum requirements which must be met,2 all other aspects of prein-
corporation subscription agreements are controlled by contract prin-
ciples.3 Many American case decisions have held that preincorpora-
tion subscriptions, usually in the form of promises made by subscrib-
ers to the future corporation, are revocable prior to actual incorpora-
tion.4 A minority view argues that mutual promises made by several
subscribers to the same venture result in an agreement binding from
the date of execution of the subscription itself." California has never
clearly decided which view it will follow,6 and the statutes are silent
on the matter.7
It may be desirable to those using preincorporation subscrip-
tions that they be in law what they purport to be in fact: legally
binding upon the parties and, unless a contrary intention appears,
irrevocable from the beginning. The purpose of this note is to
consider critically the prevalent contract theories and relevant statu-
tory provisions, and also to suggest alternatives and techniques in
using preincorporation subscription agreements in California.8
I "Under California law an agreement by prospective shareholders to
purchase stock in a proposed corporation, or unissued shares in an existing
corporation, is a binding and enforceable contract." Hoppe v. Rittenhouse,
279 F.2d 3, 8 (9th Cir. 1960). "[A]ny agreement to take stock in a corporation
is a subscription." Brown v. North Ventura Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d
227, 233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963). See Frey, Modern Development in the
Law of Preincorporation Subscriptions, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1929). "'[Plre-
incorporation subscription' denotes a written or oral manifestation, made to
a person engaged in the enterprise of forming an identifiable corporation, of
the subscriber's consent to become a shareholder of shares of a designated
class and number in the proposed corporation and to pay an ascertainable
sum thereto." Id. at 1005.
2 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25153, 25500. See text accompanying notes 65-76
infra.
3 The consequence of the application of contract principles to prein-
corporation subscriptions has not been altogether satisfactory. See text ac-
companying note 52 infra.
4 See note 17 infra.
5 See note 23 infra.
6 Research has failed to locate a single California case where the sub-
scriber has sought to withdraw before incorporation.
7 While sections of the Corporate Securities Act, CAL. CORP. CODE §§
25000-26104, set up requirements for preincorporation subscriptions, no Cali-
fornia statute has been found which makes preincorporation subscriptions
irrevocable for a period of time prior to incorporation. See discussion of
relevant California statutes accompanying notes 65-76 infra.
8 ABA MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 16(1960) provides that subscrip-
tions shall be irrevocable for 6 months.
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Preincorporation Subscriptions: Pro and Con
Several practical advantages may be realized through the use of
preincorporation subscriptions by a group organizing a corporation.
The primary use of these agreements is to raise capital with which
to finance the future corporation. 9 Often the organizers wish to ob-
tain needed capital from a number of persons outside their own
group. Ultimate receipt of such capital may be better assured and
potential financial embarrassment avoided if each potential investor
is bound by a contract to put up a specific amount of money for a
specific number of shares. This obligation becomes operative as soon
as the corporation is formed and an appropriate permit has been
obtained. 10
The preincorporation subscription agreement can also be used
to set forth matters relevant to the corporate formation. These mat-
ters include the form and manner of incorporation, the allotment of
shares to each subscriber, the consideration to be paid for the shares,
the terms of payment for the shares, the prospective source of future
funds, the determination of the original board of directors, the de-
termination of the original corporate officers, compensation to offi-
cers and directors, classes of shares to be established, and the rights,
privileges and preferences attendant to each class of shares."
A potential disadvantage of preincorporation subscriptions is that
if California follows the majority "revocable offer" theory, these
agreements may be illusory before incorporation.12 The practical
consequences of the subscriber's right to revoke are: uncertainty as to
the amount of funds a proposed corporation will have available to it
upon incorporation, or even, the possibility that there will be in-
sufficient funds to permit its formal organization.' 3 The dicta in
California cases are contradictory and fail to illuminate the path a
California court might choose in deciding a controversy directly in
point.
14
The Common Law Views
Before legislation regulating corporate activities became wide-
spread, 5 the courts interpreted preincorporation subscriptions en-
tirely through the application of contract principles.'6 The results
9 Frey, supra note 1, at 1005.
10 ADVISING CALIFORNIA BUSNESS ENTERPIUSES 505 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar
ed. 1958). The money subscribed cannot be collected until a permit for that
purpose has been issued by the California Corporation Commissioner. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25153 (b) (1). If desired, such a permit may be obtained prior
to the date of incorporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25516.
1 Winton, Private Corporate Stock Subscription Agreements, 33 S. CAL.
L. REv. 388, 389 (1960).
12 This disadvantage assumes the typical language of a subscription which
is directed solely to the future corporation and not to the other subscribers.
See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
13 4 Z. CAvWTcu, Busn;Ess ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANWMG § 86.02(1)
(a) (1967).
14 See California case law discussion accompanying notes 36-51 infra.
15 Winton, supra note 11, at 390.
10 See note 1 supra.
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have been diverse. Many American decisions17 have stated that a
subscription is not binding until the corporation has come into exist-
ence and has "accepted" the subscriber's "offer."' 8 The courts have
reasoned that withdrawal without liability naturally follows in any
situation where (a) there has been no acceptance, no mutuality or
meeting of minds and therefore no consideration, 9 and (b) the con-
templated offeree is not yet in legal existence and is obviously in-
capable of entering any contractual agreement.20 Courts following
the majority point of view have gone on to hold that in spite of
mutual promises made by several subscribers contemplating the same
objective, none of the subscribers is deprived of a "right to withdraw"
from the subscription agreement before incorporation occurs.
21
These cases seem to conclude that each subscriber's promise to take
and pay for shares is directed solely to the proposed corporation
and therefore is not sufficient legal consideration to support the prom-
ises of the others to likewise take shares, even though the other sub-
scribers may have acted to their detriment on the strength of the
withdrawer's purported subscription, or even though he may have
induced the others to subscribe.
22
Several courts following the minority viewpoint have argued that
a preincorporation subscription entered into by a number of persons
constitutes a contract between the subscribers themselves to become
stockholders when the corporation is formed pursuant to the terms
of the subscription agreement.23  Such an agreement is binding and
irrevocable from the date of subscription and amounts to a "continu-
ing offer" to the corporation which brings the corporation in as a
party after its legal formation.2 4  These cases have reasoned that
when several parties agree to contribute to a common object which
they wish to accomplish, the promise of each is a good consideration
for the promise of the others and ripens into a binding contract
among the parties.2 5
Several early California cases have suggested two other possibili-
ties that have not gained widespread acceptance. First, the subscrib-
ers could enter into an agreement with a trustee who, in execution of
an express trust, would bring the corporation into existence.20
IT Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1926); Bryant's
Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 A. 888 (1895); Hudson Real Estate
Co. v. Tower, 156 Mass. 82, 30 N.E. 465 (1892); Buffalo & N.Y. City Ry. Co.
v. Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336 (1856); Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. Green, 148 Pa.
269, 13 A. 747 (1888).
1s Additional cases collected in Annot., 61 A.L.R. 1463 (1929).
19 Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir. 1926).
20 Id.
21 E.g., Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471 (1874), discussed in
text accompanying note 45 infra.
22 Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 32 A. 888 (1895).
23 Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 41 N.W. 1026
(1889); Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, 3 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
24 Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, 3 S.W.2d 1109, 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
25 Id.
26 West v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19, 21 P. 1123 (1889). But see San Joaquin
Land & Water Co. v. West, 94 Cal. 399, 29 P. 785 (1892) (where trustee ap-
proach was not approved in case arising out of the same fact situation). See
discussion in text accompanying note 64 infra.
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The second possibility would be to treat the corporation as the
mutually contemplated third party beneficiary of the subscription
agreement.27 Such an approach would allow the corporation to en-
force the subscription after incorporation even though it were not a
party thereto originally.
2
Even those jurisdictions espousing the majority "revocable offer"
theory recognize that a subscription agreement might be framed in a
way that will bind its subscribers from the time of its execution.29
For instance, if there is consideration in addition to the mutual
promises moving to a subscriber, the contract in its entirety would
be binding from the beginning.3 0 Also, a preincorporation subscrip-
tion would be binding when it contains an authority coupled with an
interest.8 ' For example, a subscriber might give authority to the or-
ganizing group to take over his property, to perfect his subscription,
and to do anything necessary to constitute him a stockholder.3 2 The
interest of the promoters would render the authority granted them,
and therefore the subscription, irrevocable.
3
California Case Law
An affirmative answer to the question of whether a subscriber
may withdraw before incorporation is found in Moser v. Western
Harness Racing Ass'n.3 4 An attorney employed under a written con-
tract by the defendant corporation recovered a judgment for wrong-
ful discharge. The defendant corporation appealed on the grounds
that the discharge was justified because the plaintiff had tendered
erroneous legal advice. The plaintiff, one of the group that organ-
ized the defendant, had drawn a preincorporation subscription signed
by one Rogers and others. After incorporation, at the first meeting of
the board of directors, the plaintiff advised that because of Rogers'
alleged insolvency the corporation need not accept his subscription
offer. 5 Following this advice, the directors allotted Rogers' shares
27 Horseshoe Pier Amusement Co. v. Sibley, 157 Cal. 442, 108 P. 308 (1910)
(case also raises trustee possibility). See criticism of third party beneficiary
theory in text accompanying note 62 infra.
28 Id.
29 Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Peterson, 133 Ky. 596, 118 S.W. 384 (1909);
Knox v. Childersburg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180, 5 So. 578 (1888) (dictum).
30 Where subscribers contracted with a manufacturing company to erect
and equip a factory to be used by the proposed corporation, the subscription
was held irrevocable. Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Peterson, 133 Ky. 596, 118
S.W. 384 (1909).
31 In re Hannan's Empress Gold Mining & Dev. Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 643.
32 See id. at 644-45 for just such an agreement which was held binding
by the court.
33 Id. at 647-48.
34 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948).
35 It seems definitely settled in the United States and in California that
the mere fact of incorporation pursuant to the terms of the subscription ac-
cepts the offer of the subscribers and renders each of them liable to the
corporation in the amount subscribed. San Joaquin Land & Water Co. v.
Beecher, 101 Cal. 70, 35 P. 349 (1894); 1 H. BALLANTE & G. STERING, CAUi-
FoRNIA CoRPoRATioN LAws § 108 (4th ed. 1967). Of course, the corporation
must be the exact one the subscribers contemplated. California Sugar Mfg.
Co. v. Schafer, 57 Cal. 396 (1881); Marysville Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
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to others. Rogers subsequently enforced his agreement against the
corporation. In holding the plaintiff's advice to be professionally un-
sound the appellate court said:
The validity of preorganization subscription agreements conforming
to statutory regulations is universally recognized, and but with slight
research a wealth of authority on the subject is readily available.
The following principles are thoroughly established: (1) Ordinarily,
a subscription may be withdrawn at any time before the proposed
corporation is formed; (2) in California the subscription becomes
binding upon the subscriber and the corporation when the corpora-
tion is formed, in the absence of special circumstances or an agree-
ment to the contrary; (3) if, under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case there is an implied or express agreement for withdrawal of
the subscription prior to acceptance of the same by the corporation,
action by the corporation approving the subscription will be deemed
an acceptance, and the subscription will thereupon become binding
upon the subscriber and the corporation.3 6
As the facts recited above indicate, the court was called upon to
decide when acceptance occurred, that is, when the defendant cor-
poration became bound to its subscribers. Thus, postulates (2) and
(3) are relevant to the problem faced by the Moser court.37 Postu-
late (1) is merely dictum and raises several questions by its inclusion
in the court's opinion. Did the court mean to announce that Cal-
ifornia adheres to the majority "revocable offer" theory? It cited
no California authorities so holding.38 Possibly the court was indi-
cating its preference, or it may have been saying that the corporation
had no redress if all subscribers agreed to revoke the subscription
before incorporation. In any event postulate (1) seems contrary to
the sentence immediately preceding it to the effect that the validity of
preorganization subscriptions is universally recognized. Does univer-
sal recognition of validity attach before (minority view) or after
(majority view) incorporation? The questions raised by the court's
statement of postulate (1) point out the unclear state of California
law on the legal effect of preincorporation subscriptions. If the
Moser court was stating a preference for the majority rule, its view
might be in conflict with that of the California Supreme Court as
expressed in dicta in early cases. 39 In Marysville Electric Light &
Johnson, 109 Cal. 192, 41 P. 1016 (1895); Crittenden v. Credit Foncier des
Etats Unis, 94 Cal. App. 200, 270 P. 1016 (1928). However, it is not necessary
that all of the original subscribers participate in the final incorporation. Fer-
rochem Co. v. Danziger, 23 Cal. App. 584, 138 P. 966 (1913).
36 89 Cal. App. 2d at 9, 200 P.2d at 11.
37 Id. Postulates (2) and (3) seem well founded in California cases. See
note 35 supra.
38 None of the cited cases involved withdrawal or disclaimer of liability
prior to incorporation. -Compare Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347
(1874), with San Joaquin Land & Water Co. v. Beecher, 101 Cal. 70, 35 P. 349
(1894) (both cited as authority by the Moser opinion).
39 In a case where subscribers formed a plan to erect a college, the
California Supreme Court said: "If 'a number of subscribers promise to con-
tribute money on the faith of the common agreement, for the accomplishment
of an object of interest to all, and which cannot be accomplished save by their
common performance, then it would seem that the mutual promises constitute
reciprocal obligations.'" Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347, 350 (1894)
(dismissed on insufficient pleading) quoting from Watkins v. Eames, 63 Mass.
(9 Cush.) 537, 539 (1852).
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Power Co. v. Johnson4O a corporation recovered upon a preincorpora-
tion subscription agreement signed by the defendant and others.
After the plaintiff was incorporated the defendant refused to pay
calls made upon the amount for which he had subscribed. Follow-
ing a recitation of the subscription agreement, the court said:
The agreement above set out is certainly valid; the corresponding
promises of the other signers, and the common object sought to be
accomplished by all parties to it, constitute a sufficient consideration
for the promise of defendant; and upon the formation of the plaintiff
corporation by the persons signing the agreement, and plaintiff's
acceptance of the agreement, the defendant became bound to take
and pay for the number of shares subscribed for by him.4 1
From the facts of Marysville it is clear that the court was limited to
consideration of the legal effect of the agreement after incorpora-
tion. Thus, the court's statement to the effect that the common
object sought to be accomplished constituted a sufficient considera-
tion for defendant's promise is dictum. However, the court seems to
recognize that while no one could be bound to an unformed cor-
poration, one might be bound through a subscription contract to his
fellow subscribers to act in good faith in not withdrawing prior to
incorporation. But, it must be pointed out that the Marysville court
went on to quote with apparent approval from a Massachusetts case
42
clearly following the "revocable offer" theory:
"The promise of each subscriber 'to and with each other' is not a
contract capable of being enforced ... between each subscriber and
each other who may have signed previously . . . nor between each
subscriber and all the others collectively as individuals."43
While the quoted case went on to hold a subscriber bound after
incorporation and was thus authority for the Marysville decision, the
language quoted above from the Massachusetts case greatly under-
mines the worth of the language used by the California Supreme
Court.
Considering preincorporation subscriptions, a distinguished
writer, Paul A. Winton,44 suggests that there is no doubt but that
California has followed the majority view from an early time. For
support he cites to dicta in early cases to the effect that until incor-
poration, subscription agreements are merely executory.45 While use
of the word executory is unfortunate,46 these early cases may have
used the word to mean unenforceable.47 At least this argument could
be made in support of Mr. Winton's interpretation. He goes on to
list five postulates he says cover the legal consequences of preincor-
poration subscriptions in California.48  His first three are verbatim
40 93 Cal. 538, 29 P. 126 (1892).
41 Id. at 546, 29 P. at 127.
42 Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471 (1874).
43 93 Cal. at 547, 29 P. at 127 quoting 116 Mass. at 473.
44 Winton, supra note 11, at 390.
45 Id. See cases cited note 47 infra.
46 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1661 (enacted 1872) tacitly recognizes that executory
contracts may be valid.
47 Winton, supra note 11, at 390 n.8, citing San Joaquin Land & Water
Co. v. Beecher, 101 Cal. 70, 35 P. 349 (1894); California Hotel Co. v. Callender,
94 Cal. 120, 29 P. 859 (1892); Marysville Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Johnson,
93 Cal. 538, 29 P. 126 (1892). See also 6A CAL. Jvn. Corporations § 251 (1932).
48 Winton, supra note 11, at 394.
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extracts of the three Moser postulates set out above, and his last two
are corollaries well founded in California case law.49 Again, Cal-
ifornia has never directly decided to follow postulate (1) allowing a
subscriber to withdraw without liability before incorporation. On
this point California law is not clear, and its postulation may be
misleading, Moser notwithstanding.
Critical Look at the Contract Approach
In adopting a rule of law to follow, one must compare the legal
interests sought to be protected. By comparing the subscriber's in-
terest to that of the corporation or to that of the promoter, one gains
a clearer understanding of how the prevalent common law theories
developed. In explanation of the "revocable offer" theory it has been
suggested that a great number of the early American courts were
willing to allow withdrawal of preincorporation subscriptions at least
until after the corporation was formed because the judges viewed
promoters of new enterprises as "glib and persuasive individuals,"
and investors as "gullible and credulous persons."50  It is easily
understood that the courts sought to protect unwary subscribers from
exploitation. Today, the situation is different. Transfer and sale of
securities have come under strict statutory regulation.51 Such regu-
lation seems to have left the corporate organizers in a weaker legal
position than the nonpromoter subscribers who have not only the
"revocable offer" theory as a majority common law viewpoint in
their favor but also statutory protection. Under today's circum-
stances, it is clear that the "revocable offer" theory not only fails to
protect all parties to the subscription, but it also has no reasonable
basis where protection is accomplished through statutes. Strong ob-
jections have been leveled at the basic reasoning underlying this
49 Mr. Winton appears not to have cited to any direct authority for his
first postulate other than the majority common law viewpoint: "(1) Ordin-
arily, a subscription may be withdrawn at any time before the proposed
corporation is formed." Id. This is a direct quotation from Moser v. Western
Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948). The objections
discussed in the text accompanying note 38 are applicable. Postulates (4)
and (5) are worth noting: "(4) If a valid preincorporation subscription agree-
ment is in effect when the corporation is formed and the corporation is legally
competent to issue its shares, the subscribers will be bound by the terms of
the agreement." Winton, supra note 11, at 394; see Coast Amusements, Inc. v.
Stineman, 115 Cal. App. 746, 2 P.2d 447 (1931). "(5) The subscriber may be
bound by an invalid or void preincorporation subscription agreement in cer-
tain limited situations, e.g., where the rights of creditors or other innocent
third parties have intervened." Winton, supra note 11, at 395. See Moore v.
Moffatt, 188 Cal. 1, 204 P. 220 (1922). But cf. Smith v. Turner, 238 Cal. App.
2d 141, 47 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1965).
50 Frey, supra note 1, at 1012.
51 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25500: "No company shall sell any security of its
own issue, . . . or offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions
for any such security, until it has first applied for and secured from the
commissioner a permit authorizing it so to do .... " § 25003: "'Company'
includes all of the following: (a) All domestic and foreign private corpora-
tions, associations, syndicates, joint stock companies, and partnerships of every
kind. (b) Trustees. . . . (c) Individuals selling, offering for sale, negotiating
for the sale of, or taking subscriptions for, any security of their own issue."
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theory.52 The substance of these objections is that an offer, must be
made to an offeree capable of accepting the offer; while using the
term "revocable offer" this theory denies the existence of the only
possible offeree, the proposed corporation, but turns around to hold
that mere incorporation is an acceptance which ripens into a con-
tract.5 3 At least, it may be said that courts have applied contract
reasoning to preincorporation subscriptions with an uncharacteristic
looseness in logic.
5 4
The reasoning of the minority "continuing offer" view is just as
tenuous as that of the majority view. However, the minority posi-
tion strikes a more acceptable balance among all organizing interests
in need of protection. The usual subscription agreement makes no
reference to or provision for revocation prior to incorporation. 55
However, the subscription, under this viewpoint, is interpreted by
the court to contain an implied promise not to revoke. If such a
promise had been expressly stated, it might not have been acceptable
to the parties to the subscription. In addition, the practical problem
of enforcement by the subscribers who have not attempted to with-
draw must be considered.5 6 It would seem difficult for them to
prove that they cannot procure someone else to take the defaulter's
place. Further, the value of the defaulter's performance may
largely depend upon the success of the originally contemplated ven-
ture, which has become only a speculative possibility because of the
default itself.57  While the speculative nature of the damages
might give rise to an argument urging specific enforcement of the
agreement in equity, ultimate performance would be a payment of
money; and, thus it appears that damages would be the only avail-
able remedy.5
Even the third party beneficiary and trustee theories are not
without their limitations.59 Arguments have been made that laymen
organizing a corporation are seldom dealing for the benefit of a
third party, "a juridical third party of whose imminent existence they
are unaware."60  Subscribers are usually dealing for themselves.
In getting together they propose to divide the burdens and benefits of
a prospective business. Furthermore, it has been held that a newly
formed corporation may be bound by the antecedent preincorporation
subscription agreement.61 According to accepted contract principles,
a third party beneficiary is never bound to accept the bounty of a
contract made for his benefit.62 Thus this approach breaks down as
52 Schwenk, Preincorporatiom Susbscriptions: The Offer Theory and-
What is an Offer?, 29 VA. L. Rzv. 460 (1943).
53 Id. at 477-78. See note 35 supra.
54 Id. at 462.
55 See note 83 infra, which sets forth a suggested form of subscription
agreement.
56 Morris, The Legal Effect of Preincorporation Stock Subscriptions, 34
W. VA. L.Q. 219, 232 (1928).
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Deschamps v. Loiselle, 50 Mont. 565, 148 P. 334 (1915).
59 See notes 26-27 supra.
60 Morris, supra note 56, at 231.
61 Id.
62 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 137 (1932).
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a legal argument. The trustee theory may have merit if it can be
said that the promises to take and pay for stock in a proposed corpora-
tion constitute a sufficient trust res to support an express trust.6
3
A California case has been unwilling to go this far.64 It appears that
all of these common law approaches have limitations which suggest
that a new approach should be sought.
California Statutory Limitations
As stated above, California has no statutory provisions making
preincorporation subscriptions irrevocable. However, the Corporate
Securities Act6 5 recognizes these agreements in one of its important
provisions. The statute directly applicable is section 25153 of the
California Corporations Code. It provides in part that:
(a) No provision of the Corporate Securities Law prohibits sub-
scriptions for securities ... of a domestic or foreign corporation
made prior to the incorporation thereof ... ; but each such subscrip-
tion is made and accepted upon the following conditions: (1) The
corporation shall be incorporated within 90 days thereafter. (2) The
corporation when incorporated, . . . shall with reasonable diligence
apply for and secure from the commissioner a permit authorizing the
issue of the securities or the sale of the interests so subscribed for,
in accordance with such subscription. 66
This paragraph has the effect of excluding preincorporation subscrip-
tions from a permit requirement as set forth in section 25500 of the
Corporations Code.67 California cases have clearly established that
when the organizing group enters a preincorporation subscription,
the Corporate Securities Act becomes a part of that agreement,68
and unless the conditions and requirements of the Act are met, the
agreement is not enforceable. 69 It is clear that the conditions
enumerated in section 25153 operate as conditions subsequent; thus,
where there was a delay in excess of 90 days in achieving formal
incorporation, ° or where the newly formed corporation had not
63 26 GEO. L.J. 749, 755 (1939).
64 San Joaquin Land & Water Co. v. West, 94 Cal. 399, 29 P. 785 (1892).
But see Horseshoe Pier Amusement Co. v. Sibley, 157 Cal. 442, 108 P. 308
(1910); May v. State, 127 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1961) (promoter in "quasi-trustee"
relation with both corporation and subscriber).
65 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-26104.
66 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25153 (omitted portions deal with real estate in-
vestment trusts); § 25153(b): "Except as is specifically required by any
law of this State, nothing in this section permits only of the following:
"(1) The collection of any portion of the consideration to be paid on ac-
count of the subscriptions made prior to incorporation . . . unless and until
a permit has been issued by the commissioner authorizing such collection.
"(2) The taking of subscriptions for any security of any company other
than a domestic or foreign corporation . . . , or collection of any portion of
the consideration to be paid on account of such subscriptions, unless and until
a permit has been issued by the commissioner authorizing the taking of such
subscriptions or the collection thereof."
67 See note 51 supra.
68 E.g., Herkner v. Rubin, 126 Cal. App. 677, 14 P.2d 1043 (1932).
69 California W. Holding Co. v. Merrill, 7 Cal. App. 2d 131, 46 P.2d 175
(1935).
70 Herkner v. Rubin, 126 Cal. App. 677, 14 P.2d 1043 (1932); Norris (Har-
lie R.) Co. v. Lovett, 123 Cal. App. 640, 12 P.2d 141 (1932). But see Sargent
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used reasonable diligence in securing a permit to issue its shares,71
preincorporation subscriptions were held voided and legally unen-
forceable. To prevent unregulated sale of securities, section 25153
has been construed as precluding any right of inter vivos transfer or
sale of preincorporation subscription rights.72  To hold otherwise
would mean that these rights could be sold by the organizing group,
thereby skirting regulation by the corporation commissioner under
provisions of the Corporate Securities Act. 3 Of the scant litigation
in California involving the legal effect of preincorporation subscrip-
tions, most has revolved around failure to comply in one respect or
another with the conditions of section 25153. Thus, statutory com-
pliance as a prerequisite to an enforceable preincorporation sub-
scription cannot be overemphasized.
7 4
Section 1300 of the California Corporations Code, while not a part
of the Corporate Securities Act, is worthy of mention. It provides
that "[e] very subscriber to shares and every person to whom shares
are originally issued is liable to the corporation for the full considera-
tion agreed to be paid for the shares."75 In spite of suggestions that
this statute is a substantial enactment of a section of the Model
Business Corporation Act which provides that subscriptions are ir-
revocable,7 6 the language of this statute would seem to preclude
the corporation from enforcing a subscription prior to its actual in-
corporation, and no case has been found directly extending section
1300 to prevent a subscriber's attempted withdrawal prior to incor-
poration. While prior to incorporation the corporation would be
powerless to enforce the subscription, section 1300 could easily be
held applicable to prevent withdrawal. The other subscribers acting
on behalf of the proposed corporation (and of course themselves)
might bring the action, or it might be postponed until the 90 days
have elapsed and the corporation has been brought into existence in
compliance with subsection 25153 (a) (1). After incorporation the cor-
poration would be legally capable of bringing suit to enforce the
agreement against a subscriber's prior attempted withdrawal.
Conclusion
So long as traditional contract principles are used by courts to
control the law of corporate organization through the preincorpora-
tion subscription device, such principles will cast shadows of doubt
upon the legal validity of these agreements. The corporate form of
v. Coppage, 47 Cal. App. 2d 122, 117 P.2d 412 (1941), holding subscriber
bound though more than 90 days had elapsed from date of subscription to
date of incorporation. "Nothing in the language of the act nor in the deci-
sions interpreting it justifies a construction which would enable the plaintiff
(subscriber] to thus extricate himself from an unsatisfactory investment."
Id. at 126, 117 P.2d at 414.
71 Norris (Harlie R.) Co. v. Lovett, 123 Cal. App. 640, 12 P.2d 141 (1932).
72 First Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 212 Cal. 388, 298 P. 808 (1931).
73 Id. at 403, 298 P. at 814.
74 For an excellent discussion of California cases interpreting applicable
statutes, see Winton, supra note 11, at 390-94.
75 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300.
76 26 GEO. L.J. 749, 757 n.53; ABA MoDErL Bus. CORP. ACT ANw. § 16, at
298 (1960).
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business organization is not furthered by such a prospect. To over-
come the usual contract theory limitations three approaches are sug-
gested. First, new legislation might be enacted. Second, various
techniques might be employed by legal draftsmen in preparing pre-
incorporation subscription agreements. Third, judicial interpreta-
tion could extend the operation of existing statutes to cover prein-
corporation subscriptions.
The California legislature could profitably follow the example
of those states77 which have grown dissatisfied with the contract
approach and have passed provisions similar to section 16 of the
Model Business Corporation Act:
A subscription for shares of a corporation to be organized shall
be irrevocable for a period of six months, unless otherwise provided
for by the terms of the subscription agreement or unless all of the
subscribers consent to the revocation of such subscription .... 78
Such proposed legislation, if modified to read "irrevocable for a pe-
riod of 90 days" so as to complement section 25153 would be a bene-
ficial addition to the California Corporations Code.
Pending adoption of desirable legislation or judicial extension of
existing statutes, several techniques have been suggested to make the
legal enforceability of subscriptions more likely.79 First, all the sub-
scribers might promise to pay a third party for work performed, for
the projected corporation, out of the proceeds of the subscriptions.
In such circumstances the revocation by the subscriber would
breach his contract with the third party.80 Second, an agreement
might be made among the subscribers whereby each undertakes not
to revoke his subscription. The consideration for such an agreement
is the promise of each subscriber not to revoke.81 Third, the sub-
scriber might make an express promise to pay on the happening of a
stated contingency: for example, the incorporation and receipt of a
permit to issue shares.82  Any or all of these techniques might
profitably be employed by draftsmen preparing preincorporation sub-
scription agreements. A recommended form8 3 does not appear to
77 A comparable statutory provision to section 16 of the Model Business
Corporation Act is found in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, District of Columbia. ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 16, 2.01, 2.02(3) (1960). In Idaho, Louisiana, and
Washington the period is 1 year. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-109 (1948); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:6 (1950); WAsH. RE V. CODE ANN. § 23.01.060 (1961). In
New York the period is 3 months unless otherwise provided by the terms of
the subscription or if all of the subscribers or the corporation itself consents
to the revocation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 503 (a) (McKinney 1963).
78 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT AxN. § 16 (1960).
79 Cavitch, supra note 13, at § 86.02[1] [a].
80 Id. § 86.02[1] [a] (1).
81 Id. § 86.0211] [a] (2).
82 Id. § 86.02[1] [a] (3).
83 ADvISING CALIFORNIA BusINEss ENTERPRISES 506 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar
ed. 1958) recommended form:
PREINCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENTt
WHEREAS, it is contemplated that a California corporation Will
be organized for the purpose of engaging in the business of manufac-
turing and selling plastic coatings for wood, metal, and other exposed
surfaces, with an authorized capital consisting of 20,000 shares of
common stock of the par value of $10 per share, under the corporate
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utilize any of these techniques.
In the absence of appropriate legislation or a carefully drafted
preincorporaation subscription agreement, resort might be made to
the argument previously advanced in favor of the applicability of
section 1300 of the Corporations Code. If the conditions of section
25153 have been fulfilled, there should be no reason why a new cor-
poration could not bring suit under section 1300.
It is respectfully urged that clarification of California law by
passage of appropriate legislation would be the most satisfactory solu-
tion to the problems outlined in this note. In the absence of such
legislation, clarification of the law by the courts and specificity by
legal draftsmen would enhance the legal certainty of preincorporation
subscription agreements.
David B. H~arrison*
name "PLASCO, INC.," or such other name as shall be mutually
agreed upon by the undersigned; and
WHEREAS, each of the undersigned desires to subscribe for a
designated number of the shares of said corporation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, in consideration of the
premises and in consideration of the promises of each other, herein set
forth, do hereby severally subscribe for the number of shares of the
$10 par value common stock of said corporation listed opposite their
respective names below at the price indicated below and do hereby
severally agree with each other and with said proposed corporation
that they will accept and pay the purchase price for such shares in
cash, lawful money of the United States, in accordance with this
agreement.
It is mutually agreed that John Jones shall be the President of
said proposed corporation and that he shall determine all matters in
connection with the form and content of the articles of incorporation,
bylaws, and application to the Commissioner of Corporations for a
permit to issue stock of said proposed corporation, his determination
on these matters to be final and binding upon the undersigned.
This agreement is made upon the following conditions:
1. That said proposed corporation shall be incorporated within
ninety (90) days from the earliest date on which any one of the un-
dersigned first executed this agreement.
2. That said proposed corporation, when incorporated, shall with
reasonable diligence apply for and secure from the Commissioner of
Corporations of the State of California a permit authorizing the is-
suance of the shares subscribed for herein.
This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts
which, taken together, shall constitute the same agreement.
Name Date Number of Total
and of Shares Purchase
Signature Signing Subscribed For Price
As the majority "revocable offer" view would hold legally insufficient the
language: "in consideration of the promises of each other," it is suggested
that a third condition be included:
3. That this preincorporation subscription agreement becomes
legally binding upon each subscriber hereto upon his signature; and,
each subscriber promises to each of the other subscribers, and the
other subscribers collectively, that he will not attempt to withdraw or
revoke his subscription prior to incorporation of the said proposed
corporation or for ninety (90) days, whichever first occurs.
t Printed with the permission of the California Continuing Education of
the Bar. @ 1958 by the Regents of the University of California.
* Member, Second Year Class; Lt., United States Air Force.
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